FAQ: Radar-Based Drone Detection

Radar-based drone detection identifies aircraft by the radar waves they reflect — not by their radio traffic and not from a camera image. An FMCW radar measures the range and radial velocity of every reflecting object. The hard part is not receiving the echo but answering what is reflecting: a drone, a bird, moving vegetation, or a processing artefact.

The radar continuously transmits frequency-modulated signals (chirps) and evaluates the echoes. Range and Doppler FFTs produce a range-velocity map, from which a CFAR detector extracts candidates; a tracker links these over time into tracks. Only temporal stability turns an echo into a credible target candidate. Small drones are difficult because their radar cross section is very small — considerably smaller than the targets automotive radar hardware was originally designed for.

Yes, by virtue of the measurement principle. Radar measures the signal reflected by the object and does not depend on the drone transmitting anything. It therefore also picks up drones flying autonomous waypoint missions that remain invisible to Remote ID or RF receivers. Whether that yields a stable, correctly assessed target candidate depends on range, radar cross section, altitude, motion profile and site clutter.

The three approaches have different blind spots. RF detection sees the radio link between drone and pilot and is blind to autonomous flights. Cameras deliver an image with evidential value but need visibility, correct pointing and sufficient object size. Radar captures the object itself along with range and velocity, independent of light and radio — but on its own does not say what is flying. Radar therefore supplies the positional information a camera needs in order to be pointed usefully in the first place.

In principle yes; robustly in the field, Ozense has not demonstrated it yet. Rotating propellers and beating wings produce different micro-Doppler signatures, and radar cross section fluctuation differs too. Whether those features separate reliably across different sites is the central research question for Ozense. Synthetic results demonstrate modelling capability, not field performance; earlier real-data evaluations showed pronounced domain shift.

Credible field tracking of small drones has so far been in the region of 14 to 20 metres. That is the only demonstrated figure. The roughly 30 metres sometimes quoted is the sampling and evaluation boundary of the current waveform configuration — a configuration choice, not a sensor property and not a detection guarantee. Larger ranges from the link budget are development forecasts resting on assumptions that have not yet been measured together.

No. Ozense is a pre-founding research and development project. There is no orderable product, no released price, no series hardware and no completed field validation. The goal of the planned funding phase is a pilot-capable proof of concept.

The track is reported as Unknown. This is a deliberate system decision: a classifier that forces a class on thin or contradictory evidence produces confidently wrong decisions — the most expensive kind for a control room, because they cost trust. The currently permitted output is conservative in any case and says at most “possible moving drone candidate”.

No, that is not the intent. The radar channel produces no images. An existing PTZ camera is only to be slewed when there is a relevant radar candidate, and only where visibility and target geometry allow it. Continuous video recording is not part of the target architecture. The automatic PTZ cueing itself is a development goal and has not been demonstrated in the field.

Yes. Detection and alert assessment are intended to run entirely on site, on one edge unit per radar node. No cloud is required for this, which reduces latency and availability dependencies. The current architecture also avoids transmitting raw data across the site network.

There is no blanket answer, and Ozense claims no blanket GDPR compliance. A radar-first design with event-driven local image processing can make data minimisation easier, because the radar channel produces no images and no continuous video recording is intended. Legal basis, field of view, retention period, access and deletion still have to be assessed per installation; radar data can become personally identifiable in combination with other information.

For mid-sized civilian high-value sites with their own security or control-room organisation, existing or integrable PTZ/VMS technology, a concrete drone, espionage or disruption risk, and a spatially limited protection need. Priority goes to R&D, testing and prototype sites, selected sensitive industrial facilities and selected data centres. Airports, public authorities, public spaces and consumer applications are deliberately not the first market.

No. The German KRITIS Umbrella Act names environmental monitoring and detection equipment among possible resilience measures and allows risk-based requests for evidence, but it does not create a blanket procurement obligation. The need must be justified per site from risk analysis and proportionality. Ozense is neither KRITIS-certified nor approved for any particular facility type.

No. Ozense detects, assesses, documents and alerts. Interception or neutralisation measures — jamming, takeover or kinetic effects — are explicitly not part of the system and would each require separate legal authority. The operator alone decides how to respond to an alert.

Stationary operation must be clarified separately and is not automatically permitted. The general assignment covering automotive short-range radar does not make fixed-site operation automatically lawful. Ozense handles this in separate stages for its own research, for fixed pilot operation on third-party premises, and for later product operation; an application for research use is pending with the German Federal Network Agency.